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1Sub-imperial Globalisation and the Phoenix of Empire:
Sugar, Engineering and Commerce in Nineteenth Century Cuba
Jonathan Curry-Machado
(Caribbean Studies Centre, London Metropolitan University)
“I write huriedly and very late as I have just returned from a 2 days jaunt ...of a ride of 108
miles in the hot sun alternating with tropical rains”, wrote Charles Edmonstone from Cuba in 
1861:
Some of the agents here assert that neither storm or sun has an effect on me. I am
so wirey that I have offered to bet that I will kill any 5 horses that can be brought
me without rest to myself and one after another with fair fatigue. Today they find
me at Cienfuegos, next day at Villa Clara, next day at Sagua and two days after at
San Juan de los Remedios.1
Edmonstone was a migrant engineer, one of many such skilled workers who came to Cuba in
the course of the nineteenth century to install, run and maintain the steam-powered machinery
that was being introduced into the Cuban sugar industry, helping to turn the island into the
world’s leading sugar producer.2 Although British-born, the activities of Edmonstone –and
others like him coming from the North Atlantic industrial centres –reveal an independence
from the narrow national concerns of the respective imperial powers from which they came,
happily filing orders “in the United States, England or wherever the buyer wishes to give his 
preference”.3 Just as do the diasporic merchants through whom much capital investment and
foreign trade occurred,4 these migrants demonstrate the globalising processes, developing
beneath the bounds of conflicting imperial projects, which were eroding Cuba’s identity as a 
Spanish colony. However, at the same time that they were contributing to the island’s 
liberation, they were also helping to lay the foundations for the rise of new manifestations of
imperial control.
Despite the tendency for Cuban historiography to focus upon the developing national
project, this has generally been done within an implicitly transnational context, with many
historians seeing how the nation emerged not in isolation, but in reaction to competing
imperial designs over the island.5 Others have focused on the economic aspects, in particular
the island’s dependency on sugar,6 and the imperialism resulting from this.7 The strongest
analyses have looked beyond the national boundaries to take a regional approach,8 in which
1 Museo de la Ciudad, Havana (MC), Fondo Moreno Fraginals (MF), 234/28/5.
2 Jonathan Curry-Machado, Indispensable Aliens: The Influence of Engineering Migrants in Mid-Nineteenth
Century Cuba, PhD Thesis, London Metropolitan University, 2003.
3 MC, MF 234/27/1.
4 Roland T. Ely, Comerciantes cubanos del siglo XIX, Havana, 1961; Philip D. Curtin, Cross-cultural Trade in
World History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
5 Herminio Portell Vilá, Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España, 4 vols., Havana:
Jesús Montero, 1938-41; Jorge Ibarra, Nación y cultura nacional, Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1981;
Manuel Moreno Fraginals, Cuba/España; España/Cuba, Barcelona: Crítica, 1995; Christopher Schmidt-Nowara,
Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, 1833-1874, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1999.
6 Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, Azúcar y población en las Antillas, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1970
[1927].
7 Oscar Zanetti, et al., United Fruit Company. Un caso de dominio imperialista, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1977.
8 José Benítez, Las Antillas: colonización, azúcar e imperialismo, Havana: Casa de las Américas, 1977.
2the geo-political rivalries of the Atlantic powers provides the context for understanding the
history not just of Cuba, but of the Spanish Caribbean as a whole in the nineteenth century.9
In this paper I take such approaches further, through the case of the importation of
foreign steam technology into Cuba in the course of the nineteenth century, and the
experience of the migrant workers employed to operate it. Here the focus is not on Cuba as an
isolatable entity, but existing in the context of transnational networks that were involving the
island in processes of globalisation.10 However, rather than seeing these processes as the
consequence of imperial designs, I argue that this was, at the outset, a ‘sub-imperial’ 
globalisation, operating independently, and implying liberation, from empire.
The growth in Cuban sugar production from the end of the eighteenth century saw the
emergence of a creole elite that sought the development of the island. The search for new
technologies to enable improvements in sugar production necessarily took them beyond the
restricted possibilities of the Spanish empire, to the industrial centres of the United States,
Britain and France. They were assisted in this both by the migrant engineers that accompanied
the new machinery, and also the often foreign-born merchants who enabled the island’s 
involvement in the transnational commercial networks through which sugar was exported and
industrial goods imported. Such tendencies made Spanish dominion over Cuba increasingly
irrelevant, and helped fuel the emergence of an independent Cuban identity.
However, the same globalising tendencies that were eroding Spanish empire were
causing Cuba to fall into new forms of imperial domination. The increasing expense of the
new steam technology led to a growing dependence upon investment from foreign merchant
banks, which gradualy assumed control over much of the island’s production and trade.
Despite some efforts to develop indigenous industry, Cuba remained dependent upon foreign
technology. The same migrant engineers who had begun by assisting Cuban planters, took on
the role of agents for foreign companies. Rather than contributing their skills, as one more
group of migrants in a nation formed out of multiple migrations, engineers such as Charles
Edmonstone asserted their foreign identity, and guarded their privileged position. They came
to be seen as symbolic of the process by which Cuba shook off the Spanish yoke only to
replace it with another.
Sugar and Technological Advances
Although sugar began to be produced in Cuba in the sixteenth century, this remained on a
small-scale until the final years of the eighteenth century, when Cuba found itself particularly
well-placed to benefit from the vacuum in the world sugar market resulting from revolution in
neighbouring Saint Domingue.11 Occurring at a time of growing world demand, with it
becoming an increasingly important element of proletarian diets in Europe and North
America,12 sugar prices rose rapidly making an expansion in cane fields particularly attractive
9 Luis Martínez-Fernández, Torn Between Empires: Economy, Society and Patterns of Political Thought in the
Hispanic Caribbean, 1840-1878, Athens & London: University of Georgia Press, 1994.
10 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Sin azúcar no hay país: the transnational counterpoint of sugar and nation in
nineteenth century Cuba’, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies (84:1), 2007.
11 Benítez (1977), pp.136-8; Julio Le Riverend, Historia Económica de Cuba, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1967: 161; Sherry Johnson, Social Transformation of Eighteenth Century Cuba, Gainsville: University
Press of Florida, 2001.
12 Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: the Place of Sugar in Modern History, New York: Penguin, 1985,
pp. 74-150.
3for Cuban planters who had previously devoted most of their land to coffee.13 The rise in
Cuban sugar production was later assisted by the crisis in the British West Indies following
slave emancipation,14 at a time when despite the outlawing of the slave trade the use of chattel
labour in Cuba intensified.15
As a result, by the mid-nineteenth century Cuba had become the world’s leading sugar 
producer, accounting for more than 40% of all cane sugar,16 with the island’s importance seen 
not only in quantity but also in quality, “being of a dry, firm grain [and] therefore always sold 
readily and at good prices”.17 The mid-nineteenth century saw the establishment of large
numbers of new plantations and sugar mills, with the sugar frontier moving inexorably down
the island.18 The scale of production likewise increased, with the average output per mill
growing from just 72 tons a year in 1830 to 316 tons by 1860,19 with the largest producing as
much as 3,000 tons in a single harvest.20
Sugar not only came to dominate land use, but also Cuba’s trade. Between 1827 and 
1846, sugar and its derivatives made up almost two-thirds of the island’sexports,21 bringing
with it considerable wealth to those in a position to benefit. Although excluded from political
power by the Spanish, prominent Cuban families, with fortunes accumulated from expanding
sugar plantations, dominated not just rural society,22 but national life in general. This new
economic elite was instrumental in the emergence of liberal, modernising bodies, in particular
the Real Consulado and the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, through which
enlightenment influences and scientific advances from Europe and North America found their
way into Cuba.
They also went out of their way to facilitate the introduction of the latest advances in
steam technology and sugar milling machinery, and in this it was immediately evident how
irrelevant Spain had become to the island’s development. For example, in 1851 atempts were 
made by the authorities to facilitate the purchase of a first class steam engine from Spain, out
of a desire to stimulate Spanish rather than foreign industry,23 news having reached them that
engines were built there just as well and solidly as in other countries. However, when
enquiries were made, the best they could come up with was a factory that boasted to be able to
build any sugar mill, so long as they were given the details of the steam engine to be used –
the implication being that they would be unable to supply this themselves.24 The reality was
13 Louis A. Pérez Jr., Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 2nd Edition, New York & Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995, pp.71-4.
14 Michelle Harrison, King Sugar: Jamaica, the Caribbean and the World Sugar Economy, London: Latin
America Bureau, 2001, p.107; William A. Green, British Slave Emancipation: the Sugar Colonies and the Great
Experiment, 1830-1865, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
15 Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, et al., Historia de la nación cubana, Havana, 1952, p.78; Franklin W. Knight, Slave
Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, p.24.
16 Moreno Fraginals, Manuel, El Ingenio, Vol.3, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978, pp.35-7; Alan
Dye, Cuban Sugar in the Age of Mass Production: Technology and the Economics of the Sugar Central, 1899-
1929, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.27.
17 Richard McCulloh, Reports from Secretary of the Treasury of Scientific Investigations in Relation to Sugar
and Hydrometers, Washington, 1848.
18 Marrero, Levi, Cuba: economía y sociedad, Vol.10, Madrid, 1973-86, p.278; Moreno Fraginals (1978).
19 Pérez (1995), p.75.
20 Benítez (1977), p.200.
21 Marrero (1973-86), Vol.12, p.115.
22 Laird W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: the social and economic history of
monoculture in Matanzas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
23 Anales de las Reales Junta de Fomento y Sociedad Económica de la Habana, Tomo IV (1851), p.247.
24 Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Gobierno Superior Civil (GSC), 372/14200.
4that steam engines, and almost all other sugar machinery, had to be obtained from the
industrial centres of Great Britain, the United States and France. New York, Glasgow,
Liverpool and Le Havre, the port cities that together formed the nexus for nineteenth century
Atlantic commerce, were also the principal centres for the engineering industry, and the
source of most of the steam engines and other machinery imported into Cuba.25
However, although the machinery came from the factories of such rival imperial
powers, the initial impulse for its introduction into Cuba came not from attempts by these
powers to challenge Spanish control over the island, but from Cuban planters seeking to
satisfy Cuba’s developmental needs by accessing the latest technological advances. Prominent 
landowners became students of milling and refining technology, eagerly learning from all
such developments and exploring how to apply them to their own industry. In 1849, Joaquín
de Ayesterán became the first planter to install centrifuges in a Cuban mill,26 just five years
after the first ever demonstration of the use of a centrifuge for separating sugar crystals, in
Germany.27 In 1850, he travelled to Europe, visiting Liverpool, Birmingham and Paris, and
returning to Cuba with the materials and machines he needed to modernise his ‘Amistad’ 
estate.28
During the mid-nineteenth century the use of steam in Cuba’s sugar mills became
generalised,29 with 70% using steam engines by 1860 from just 20% in 1846.30 Advances were
introduced in all aspects of sugar production, so enabling the improvements in quality for
which Cuban sugar became renowned.31 Accelerated sugar production also required improved
transport, and this led to the development (again using mainly British and North American
technology) of an extensive rail network –the sixth in the world to be constructed, several
years before that in Spain itself–32 and steam boat routes. Although leading to the importation
of large quantities of machinery, far from originating in a process of imperial penetration of
the Cuban market by foreign producers, the initial impulse for this came from Cuba itself,
through personally-established networks. Not only did this enable the development of Cuba’s 
sugar production and infrastructure through inclusion in the globalising distribution of new
technologies; but it also enabled the engineering companies themselves to further extend the
reach of their products, far beyond the bounds of their respective national empires. In the
initial years, this occurred not through the unequal exchanges characteristic of economic
imperialism, but through the equal interchange between Cuban planters and foreign machine
manufacturers, in a process that sidelined Spanish imperial control over the island.
25 Paul Butel, The Atlantic, London & New York: Routledge, 1999, pp.223-33.
26 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: the socio-economic complex of sugar in Cuba, 1760-1860, New
York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1976, p.117.
27 Geoffrey Fairrie, Sugar, Liverpool: Fairrie & Co., 1925, p.168.
28 Biblioteca Nacional ‘José Martí’, Havana (BNJM), Lobo 108, Vol.3, File 2.
29 Martínez-Fernández (1994), p.98; Bergad (1990), p.90.
30 Marrero (1973-86), Vol.10, p.159.
31 Moreno Fraginals (1978); Dye (1998); Curry-Machado (2003a).
32 Oscar Zanetti & Alejandro García, Caminos para el azúcar, Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1987.
5Migrant Engineers and Transnational Development
This new machinery required specialised labour for its installation, operation and
maintenance, and Cuba lacked workers with the necessary skills.33 As a result, “with steam 
engines came mechanics, who were mostly foreigners”:34
[E]very mill, every steam boat, every train locomotive has to have with it an
intelligent foreigner to direct and inspect the engine.35
Such skilled workers were generally looked for in the same countries that produced the
machinery. Often orders included a condition that appropriate technicians be sent at the same
time “to put together that machinery and remain in charge of it”.36 For example, when two
steam boats to be used in Matanzas bay were bought in New York from the Novelty Iron
Works, it was stipulated that the factory should provide two trustworthy engineers skilled in
their operation.37 Likewise, when locomotives were acquired from Philadelphia for the
Cárdenas to Bemba railway in 1839, it was requested that they should come with “a man who 
knows how to direct them”.38
Even when there were engineering workers available locally, there was often a
preference shown by planters to engage those recommended by the manufacturers, and who
had proven experience with the specific machines that they were installing. They would also
be recruited on behalf of planters and other employers through agents placed in countries such
as Britain and the United States. In 1838, the chief engineer of the Havana-Güines line
ordered four locomotives from Britain. He requested that Alexander Robertson, who was
acting as both the chief investor and British agent of the rail company, also find, along “with 
duplicates of machinery”, four engineers “and as many machinists or men who understand the 
repair and construction of Locomotives”.39
The number of engineering workers in these countries increased greatly during the
nineteenth century;40 and although such workers were amongst the better paid, lived in less
cramped conditions and had least recourse to the workhouse,41 for many poverty and job
insecurity continued to be a threatening presence.42 With the exportation of machinery around
the world came an extension of the well-established tramping tendencies of engineering
workers.43 While there were many who travelled to Cuba intentionally, often with pre-
arranged jobs, others arrived almost by accident, as they pursued journeys from one job and
place to another. For example, William Bisby had passed through a wide selection of jobs in
the United States, before accepting a position on a steam ship. This opened up to him the
33 Bergad (1990), pp.121-2.
34Fé Iglesias García, ‘The Development of Capitalism in Cuban Sugar Production, 1860-1900’, in Manuel 
Moreno Fraginals, Frank Moya Pons & Stanley L. Engerman (eds), Between Slavery and Free Labor: the
Spanish-speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p.58.
35 Francisco de Paula Serrano, in Memorias de la Sociedad Económica de la Habana, Tomo IX (1840), p.240.
36 British Parliamentary Papers 1841 (I) vii, pp.88-9.
37 Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) (AHN), Ultramar, Cuba/Fomento, 35/2, No.35.
38 Diario de la Habana, 24 November 1839.
39 ANC, Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento (RCJF), 131/6412.
40 Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, London: Penguin, 1969, p.117.
41 Geoffrey Crossick, An Artisan Elite in Victorian Society: Kentish London, 1840-1880, London: Croom Helm,
1978, pp.110-3.
42 John Belchem, Industrialization and Working Class: The English Experience, 1750-1900, Aldershot: Scolar
Press, 1990, p.156.
43 Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986.
6possibility of travelling overseas in search of work, prompted by the unstable prospects he
had experienced back home, eventually leading him into employment in Cuba.44
A lively internal labour market for engineering workers quickly developed in Cuba, as
burgeoning sales of steam engines and steam machinery brought a rapid increase in their
demand. Those already established in the island provided a route in for others eager to work
there, often seeking out opportunities for them. It was in this way that William Whitehorn left
Britain “in order to fit up machinery in Cuba”, contracted by the veteran engineer Edward
Beanes.45 Joel Watts travelled to Cuba having been assured by Henry Elkins, who was already
established on a sugar estate, that he would have secure employment there. On his arrival this
job proved not to exist, but he nevertheless found work in the foundry in Havana.46
By the 1860s this job market was well-established, with migrant engineering workers
often passing from one job to another based on word-of-mouth recommendations,47 placing
adverts in the local press, or directly approaching potential employers. As more and more
gained experience of Cuba, their presence made the necessity for the engine manufacturers to
provide artisans less pressing. As early as 1838, the planter Pedro Diago told William Kemble
of the West Point Foundry that he would not need him to send out anybody with his new
machinery, since he was already in agreement with the man who had mounted the machinery
of a neighbouring mil, “and this one has the advantage for me that he speaks Spanish, and 
has experience of this country”.48 Although Baring Brothers intended to send a favourite
engineer of theirs, to oversee the instalation of the new steam engine and mil on the ‘Aroyo’ 
estate,49 he himself declined the position, recommending that they should simply employ the
engineer already working there, “saying he knew he was as competent as any man we could 
find”. Besides, he had no need to accept since he had more than suficient engagements to 
keep him occupied.50
So long as the machinery was running smoothly, the job of a sugar mill engineer was a
relatively relaxed one. Even during the grinding season, when they supposedly had little free
time because their full attention was required (and even more so during the other six months
of the year when there was relatively little work to be done at the mill, beyond routine
maintenance), such workers had much opportunity to turn their attention to more than merely
keeping existing engines in operation. Their time in Cuba provided them with the knowledge
and experience necessary to make contributions to further technological development. For
example, Ezra Dod invented, while working on Cuban sugar estates, a “tubular juice heater”, 
which “worked with the exhaust steam of the mil engine as the estate had no multiple efect”; 
an “upright tube vacuum pan”; and a new housing for the mil, successfuly demonstrating the 
advantages to be gained by placing the cane carrier in such a way as to ensure that the cane
entered at right angles to the mill rollers.51
Seasonal employment also enabled them to divide their time between work in Cuba,
and leisure in the United States or Europe. It was very common for planters to take advantage
of such trips to use them as agents charged with placing orders with factories for new
44 ANC, Comisión Militar (CM) 51/1, pp.416-29.
45 Public Record Office, London, (PRO), FO 72/830, No.6); PRO, FO 72/830, No.24.
46 ANC, CM, 51/1, pp.277-8.
47 BNJM, Sociedad T.34, No.1a.
48 BNJM, Lobo 111, Vol.3.
49 Barings Archive, London (BA), LB 22, No.231.
50 BA, HC 4.6.10, No.65.
51 Louisiana Planter & Sugar Manufacturer, 7 February 1914 & 11 September 1915.
7machinery and parts.52 Although most planters had commercial agents representing them, it
was felt that these skilled workers were most effective in such a role, since they could give
very precise specifications to the manufacturers.53 Thus when Henry Elkins travelled back to
Britain in 1843 to spend the summer, he placed orders directly with the leading Liverpool
firm of sugar machine manufacturers, Fawcett Preston.54 In June 1840, Frederick Shuck, who
worked on Francisco Diago’s ‘Caunabaco’ estate, left for the United States carying a leter of
introduction from his employer to the later’s commercial representative in New York, who he 
requested to place an order at the West Point Foundry according to the specifications given by
Shuck, who was to return to Cuba in September.55
Thus althoughthe initial stimulation for Cuba’s involvement in the technology-driven
globalisation that was underway in the nineteenth century came from the desire of Cuban
planters to develop sugar production, and with it increase their own fortunes; the migrant
engineering workers that this required quickly became the agents through whom such
networks became strengthened and extended, motivated primarily by considerations of
technological and commercial advantage, rather than furthering economic imperialist
interests. They assisted Cuba’s entrepreneurs in their break from Spanish monopoly, to the 
free selection of where best to take their business, apparently liberated from commitment to
any particular national or imperial interests.
Merchants and Transnational Commercial Networks
An important role was played in the importation of machinery, as well as the contracting of
the necessary skilled workers, by merchant houses based in the island, often founded by
foreign-born merchants who did much to improve Cuba’s place within the international
commercial networks. While the majority of merchants operating in Cuba were from Spain,56
there was an important hard core of non-Spanish traders who dominated much of the island’s 
import and export business, and were highly influential in the development of the island’s 
connections with Europe and North America.57 This was a group that showed little
commitment to specific national interests. Although Drake Brothers & Co. was founded by
the British émigré James Drake in the 1790s, they traded more heavily with Spain, France,
Russia and Germany than with Britain.58 In the mid-nineteenth century, in addition to the sons
of Drake, the house’s partners included a Spaniard, a North American and a Swiss.59
Foreign merchants brought with them a spirit of speculation into Cuban commerce
that was otherwise lacking.60 As a result of their good contacts with merchants and
manufacturers in Europe and North America, these traders were able to claim that they could
“execute orders more advantageously”;61 or else gain advantage through their superior
knowledge of modern commercial methods.62 Hence although Adot, Spalding & Co. had “no 
52 BNJM, Lobo 111/1.
53 Glasgow University Archives and Business Records Centre (GUABRC), UGD 118/1/2/3.
54 ANC, CM 51/1.
55 BNJM, Lobo 109/3.
56 Roland T. Ely, Cuando reinaba su majestad el azúcar, Havana: Imágen Contemporánea, 2001 [1963], p.317.
57 Ely (1961).
58 MC, MF, 235/1/24.
59 Ely (1961), pp.83-140.
60 BA, HC 4.6.1, Nos.4-5.
61 BA, HC 4.6.12, No.141.
62 BA, HC 4.6.1, No.1.
8property outside of their business capital which is supposed not to be large”, they were much 
sought after, and had a very good credit rating both in Cuba and the United States, where they
had “many good friends”.63
These were the merchants through whom the transnational commercial networks
reached into Cuba. It was common for partnerships to include one member living in the
island, with the other in another country. Thus the dry goods business of Tennant & Clark was
made up of Tennant in Havana and Clark in England;64 and the Matanzas-based merchant
Florentio Huertas teamed up with James Baring (British-born) in Wiesbaden (Germany).65
Where they did not have a formal partner, they allied themselves closely with particular
individuals, such as Henry Coit in the United States, who acted as an agent on behalf of many
Cuban-based merchants and planters, in combination with the merchant bankers Moses
Taylor of New York.66
It was through these commercial networks that Cuba’s import and export trade was 
carried out. Merchant houses like Drake Brothers opened up trading routes that ranged as far
afield as New York, Spain, Britain, Belgium, Trieste and St Petersburg.67 They actively
encouraged leading Cuban planters to consign their crops through such merchant bankers as
Baring Brothers in London,68 or Moses Taylor in New York. These merchant bankers would,
in turn, help to ensure the penetration of Cuban products into more distant markets.69
Technology and the Merchant Banks
By the end of the 1840s large amounts of capital were being invested by Cuban planters in
machines, and this tended to increase through the century as more advances were made. By
1873, the British Consul at Havana was reporting:
The machinery and engines on the Cuban estates are generally of an expensive
and superior character.... [I]mmense capital is invested solely in the
‘manufacture’; and sugar, far superior in quality to the ‘muscavado’ of Jamaica 
and Demerara, is made here on the estates themselves.... [E]verything has been
done, at vast cost, to supersede or supplement manual labour.70
Such outlays required finance, and since initially there were no banks operating directly in the
island, and no system of government securities, planters, and the Cuban economy in general,
quickly became highly dependent upon the foreign-led commercial networks, and in debt to
foreign bankers.71 Although the Cuban financial system did gradually develop through the
mid-nineteenth century, such that by 1857 there was one principal bank with deposit and
63 BA, HC 4.6.8 (Part 3), No.307.
64 BNJM, Lobo 113/1.
65 BA, HC 4.6.12.
66 BNJM, Lobo 113.
67 (Ely, 1961: 83-140)
68 BA, HC 4.6.8 (Part 1), No.19.
69 BA, HC 4.6.2 (Part 2), Nos.216-8.
70 Greenock Sugar Trade Review, 2 April 1873.
71 Ely (2001 [1963]), p.300; Susan J. Fernández, Encumbered Cuba: Capital Markets and Revolt, 1878-1895,
Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2002.
9discount facilities, empowered to issue bank notes, and several other banks in operation,72
these were themselves often underwritten by foreign bankers.73
These foreign bankers were increasingly underpinning most of Cuba’s commerce and 
economy, and the door was opened to them by the foreign merchant community. In 1832,
George Knight proposed that Baring Brothers become his sleeping partners.74 Though he was
keen for them to leave him to manage his own affairs in the island, this enabled the merchant
bankers to gain a foothold in Cuba, which would gradually turn into a stranglehold. When
Knight ran into financial difficulties a few years later, he was forced into bankruptcy by
Barings, who readily extended their credit facilities to Knight’s successor,75 drawing the latter
deeper into debt through the granting of additional credits.76
Such credits were soon also being made to Cuban planters. As Roland Ely notes:
Credit was the life blood of the island’s system for the commercialization of 
sugar. Without improvements in production and without long-term loans, few
planters would have been in a condition to feed and clothe their workers, buy
agricultural implements and necessary machines, cultivate new land or satisfy
their personal pleasures.77
The same merchants who had initially been the channel bringing foreign investment into
Cuba, came to act as the conduits through which control by the foreign bankers was applied.
Mortgages became more and more common, “often in the form of loans secured against the 
earnings of future crops”.78 Economic crises, or simply a poor crop, would lead to defaults in
payments, as a result of which ownership of Cuban plantations began to fall into the hands of
foreign bankers. Two-thirds of Cuba’s sugar industry had become mortgaged in this way by 
the 1860s, with some 95% of estates at least partially so.79 Their policy was “that of a usurer,” 
commented the Cuban planter Betancourt Cisneros, “who litle by litle provides means to a 
youthful fool until he places him on an unrepayable debt, and then proceeds to embargo his
real estate”.80 Planters, particularly those of small to middle-sized estates, would thus lose
their plantations, administration of which was turned over by the bank to merchant companies
resident in Cuba.81 The banks were not content simply to sit back and receive whatever
profits accrued. Baring Brothers regularly sent agents to Cuba to inspect their newly acquired
property,82 and would continually pressure the merchants representing their interests to ensure
“the most rigid economy” on the estates.  This helped to push Cuban plantations towards to 
lowering the quality of sugar produced.83 All management decisions now had to be approved
by the bank, as for example when the manager of the ‘Aroyo’ plantation requested an 
72 BA, HC 4.6.8 (Part 2), No.185.
73 BA, HC 4.6.8 (Part 3), No.333.
74 BA, HC 4.6.2 (Part 1), No.26.
75 BA, HC 4.6.2 (Part 2), No.213a.
76 BA, HC 4.6.2 (Part 2), No.239.
77 Ely (2001 [1963]), p.301.
78 Louis A. Pérez Jr., Winds of Change: Hurricanes and the Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Cuba, Chapel
Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, p.96.
79 Martínez-Fernández (1994), p.106, citing Moreno Fraginals.
80 Cited by Martínez-Fernández (1994), p.128.
81 Guerra y Sánchez (1970 [1927]).
82 BA, HC 4.6.10, No.88.
83 BA, HC 4.6.10, No.67.
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increase in his salary, the merchants who administered the estate on behalf of Baring Brothers
had to make representations to the bank in London for this to be approved.84
It has been argued that by the mid-nineteenth century merchants in Cuba had displaced
the old Creole landowning class “from the pinnacle of Cuban prosperity”.85 However, even
the foreign-born merchants who played such an important part in opening up Cuba to the
wider commercial networks had themselves fallen under the control of the increasingly
powerful foreign merchant bankers. As with the planters, they were dependent upon the
success of the sugar harvest, and its trade, for their own survival.86 Having started as
innovators, they quickly took on the role of debt collectors. This ensured that not just Cuban
trade, but increasingly land ownership and production fell under foreign control. This would
come to be exacerbated after 1868, when the Cuban wars of independence led to a far greater
weakening of the position of the Cuban landowners, and a far greater penetration of foreign
capital and ownership.
Migrant Engineers and Frustrated Nationalism
With the foreign engineering workers playing such an important part in the technological
development of Cuba’s sugar industry, it might be expected that their presence would have 
been seen to have a positive influence upon the island. However, so connected to the
introduction of steam engines and other machinery were the increasing debts that were
leading to the island falling inexorably into foreign hands, that the engineers themselves came
to be seen as symbolising the new foreign economic domination that Cuba was beginning to
become subjected to. Having begun as contributors to the process by which, through new
globalising technologies, Cuba was gradually shaking off imperial Spanish control, the
migrant engineers became representatives of the flip-side of this liberation through which new
forms of imperial subjection were being imposed.
When large numbers of foreign engineering workers first began to arrive their
presence was seen as beneficial.  In 1838, Francisco Diago commented that it “suited al of 
them that there should be abundant engineering workers in the Island”;87 and Francisco de
Paula Serrano declared in 1839:
Small matter that they be foreigners who at present direct the machines; my
principles are not founded on such absurd nationalism.88
Such support was not simply because of their technological contributions, but also because, in
a culture in which manual labour was looked down upon by many whites who felt that manual
labour was racially demeaning, the migrant engineers helped to make it acceptable to get your
hands dirty. They were also exceptionally well paid, and this more than anything
demonstrated just how respectable this was as a career for a young white Cuban. It became a
valued prize to secure an apprenticeship in a North American foundry. In the late 1850s, it
cost between $20 and $30 a month for a Cuban to be placed with a North American
84 BA, HC 4.6.10, No.16.
85Anton L. Alahar, ‘Slaves, Slave Merchants and Slave Owners in 19th Century Cuba’, Caribbean Studies 21:1-
2 (1988), p.174.
86 Ely (2001 1963]).
87 BNJM, Lobo 109/3.
88 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, Tomo IX, 1840, p.240.
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engineering firm,89 and hence those who sought advancement in this way had either to be
from reasonably well-off families, or have a wealthy sponsor.
With so many foreign engineers working in the island, it would have been more
logical if apprenticeships could be served directly with them, without any need to leave the
country. However, there was considerable resistance amongst the foreigners to take such a
responsibility seriously, despite official attempts to enforce it. The Sociedad Económica
(which oversaw many of the economic and infrastructural improvements of the period) felt
that foreigners opening workshops in Cuba should be obliged to take on local apprentices, to
teach them their trade –and there was growing resentment that many of them declined so to
do.90 Engineering was a trade with a long tradition of craft-exclusiveness, access to which
was often closely guarded. Juan Angel Echerri discovered this on being apprenticed to the
machine workshop of the foreign engineers Keen and Lochkurd in Cienfuegos. He spent four
years in the workshop, in which time his foreign masters paid little attention to his education
in the trade, using him and others as little more than cheap labour. They finally refused to
qualify him, because he “was a blockhead incapable of learning”, though it would seem that 
in fact they had simply not bothered to train him in the necessary skills.91
Such intransigence fed a growing opposition to their presence in Cuba, augmented by
jealousy of the privileges extended to them, and paranoia of the possibly detrimental political
and cultural role that they were thought to be playing. This contributed to the finger of
suspicion being pointed at several foreign engineers in the 1840s, accused of complicity in
revolutionary conspiracies and slave uprisings.92 In the 1850s, such was the atmosphere of
paranoia that surrounded the migrant engineering workers that an official order was sent out
by the island’s Governor to his oficials in the provinces to keep a careful watch and account 
of all such foreign engineers, their absences and movements, with the clear implication that
this groups should be especially suspected of subversive involvement.93
Attempts were also made to establish specialist schools in the island to train
indigenous engineering workers. By so doing it was hoped to end the skills shortage that had
made the immigration necessary in the first place. The first suggestion for the establishment
of such a school came in the late 1830s, not long after the immigration of foreign engineering
workers had begun in earnest. It was an increasing concern for the authorities in Havana that,
as more and more steam engines, mills and other high-tech equipment poured into the
country’s plantations, the country was finding itself not only dependent upon foreign capital, 
but also upon the physical presence in the island of many foreign skilled workers. They were
not so concerned about the carpenters, masons, or even boilermakers who arrived. From the
start, they were disproportionately preoccupied about the foreign engineers. As Cubans
travelled abroad to learn the necessary skills, and returned to the island, there were attempts
locally to pass such knowledge on to their countrymen. In 1845, the following proposal to
establish a school in Matanzas was advertised in the press:
The desire to have schools of mechanics, as applied to the steam engines of the
sugar mills and railways, is about to be satisfied. A native of Matanzas, educated
89 BNJM, Lobo 135/2.
90 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, 1843 (2), pp.7-9.
91 ANC, GSC, 1608/81938.
92 Jonathan Curry-Machado, ‘Catalysts in the Crucible: kidnapped Caribbeans, free black British subjects and 
migrant British machinists in the failed Cuban revolution of 1843’, in Nancy Naro (ed.), Blacks and National
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93 ANC, GSC, 1285/50277.
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abroad, where he has been a director of large establishments, and has constructed
railroads, wishes to give to his homeland the precious gift of educating its sons
and so free them from a foreign contribution.94
The greatest efforts for establishing an engineering school were in Havana, where the need for
such specialist training coincided with the drive by the Sociedad Económica to improve
working class education in general. In 1845 they opened an Escuela de Maquinaria (School
of Machinery).95 Although they were only able to admit fifty students, due to the size of the
building they were provided with, within a year they were boasting success, claiming that
many landowners, for whom the students had worked during the year, were returning to
contract them for the coming grinding season:
because they have not been able to avoid feeling heated by that holy patriotic fire
that is always to be found in the breasts of the Spanish, when they so visibly
perceive happy results. 96
Encouraging as this no doubt was for the patriotically minded, and important as it was as a
first step in Cuba towards the development of industrial skills, the School made little real
impression, at least in the short term, on the country’s need forforeign workers. The latter
were quite scathing of the efforts of the School:
One very grave [obstacle] has been that the opinion of the foreign engineers has
constantly been opposed to [the School], and without knowing nor even visiting it,
they have declared the impossibility that good operatives could be produced by an
establishment that does not belong to them, and which is not in France or England
but in Havana.97
They may have had a point. Since the numbers graduating from the School were hardly a
threat to the job prospects of the foreign engineers, given the ever-increasing demand for such
workers and the general shortage of them, it is unlikely that such criticism was motivated by
selfish reasons. It seems that the sponsors and organisers of the School underestimated the
degree of training needed to be able to take personal charge of the equipment of a sugar mill,
dealing with all eventualities. The foreign engineers generally began their education in the
trade in early adolescence. Having served an apprenticeship lasting several years, they
qualified to become journeymen. Their training did not stop there. If they aspired to become
masters, they not only had to work their way up the workshop hierarchy, but also obtain
specialist technical education. Even though many of them may have travelled to Cuba in the
hope of short-circuiting the craft exclusiveness that may have prevented them from
advancement in their home countries, the average age on arrival of the foreign engineers was
31 years old.98 Supposing they had begun in the trade around the age of 14, they had thus
already an average of 17 years experience before being employed in Cuba.
This was something that does not seem to have been fully appreciated. Many of the
Cubans who studied in the School of Machinery, and their families, seem to have believed
that “they could be, and that they are, complete engineers in a year”.99 Often driven by the
prospect of the high earnings they dreamed of obtaining (and which they saw the foreigners
94 El Faro Industrial de la Habana, 10 April 1845.
95 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, Tomo 36, 1848 (1), pp.31-4.
96 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, Tomo 33, 1846 (2), p.359.
97 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, Tomo 36, 1848 (1), pp.31-4.
98 ANC, Miscelánea de Libros (ML), 11080, 11397 & 11910.
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claiming), this failure to understand the slow, incremental path of formation needed not just
by aspiring engineers, but by the country as a whole in its attempt to develop the skills needed
by its economy, led to a high dropout rate from the School. Not surprisingly, this provoked
considerable scepticism on the part of the foreign engineers. However, by seeking to protect
the standards of their craft, which they saw being undercut by the School, while at the same
time generally showing little interest in playing a positive role in the development of native
engineers, they exacerbated the feelings of hostility shown towards them, and fuelled the
impulse that led to the establishment of the School in the first place.
In 1851, coinciding with heightened official paranoia concerning the presence of so
many foreign engineers in the country, the Junta de Fomento took control of the School, “so 
that it may succeed in the important and primordial objective of satisfying our local
necessities without the help of foreign hands”.100 For the Captain General and Governor of
Cuba, José Gutiérrez de la Concha, this was more a patriotic undertaking than one of
economic necessity. Whereas, in its original conception the school was intended to provide
training for the brightest of the urban working class; priority was now to be given to “the 
orphans of military families and servants of the State, and particularly those who lost their
lives and fortunes in the defence of Spain in our old American possessions.”  They would 
form a bulwark against the foreign engineers “who, spread about our sugar mils and on the 
railroads, are a seed for propaganda in the ideas of secession, and who are internal enemies
that it is essential that we free ourselves from”.101
The change was a disaster. The school moved away from the modest planting of seeds
whose fruit the country would be able to gather at some point in the future, gradually
improving the foundation of skils upon which the island’s economy could be developed. The 
new directors attempted to turn it into a “large industrial enterprise.”  Rather than simply 
providing subsidised training for those who would go to work in the mills and railways,
teaching them the theory that they would put into practice in their employment; expensive
foreign machinery was purchased, and the students turned into apprentices, learning quite
advanced applications of steam technology through construction. While the result was a
workshop of which the State could be proud, this attempt to rival in Havana the great
foundries of the United States, Britain and France was doomed to failure. The school had
originally been started with the simple project of providing whatever training was necessary
for native engineers to replace the foreigners. They now found themselves saddled with an
institution which wished both to provide highly trained technicians, and produce its own
machines at the same time: and to do so overnight, without the pre-existing industrial
infrastructure and skills base that the industrial metropolises possessed.102
Far from freeing Cuban planters and rail companies from the necessity of contracting
foreign engineers, if anything the School accentuated the reliance on these outsiders.
Although by the 1850s there was a small but growing number of suitably skilled natives, they
were not sufficient to meet the increased demand for such workers as the use of steam engines
and mills became not only generalised, but extended, with the sugar frontier pushing
inexorably eastwards. The debacle of the school experiment was unlikely to inspire
confidence amongst the majority of planters, who were driven more by economic than
patriotic concerns, and were anyway more likely to be prejudiced in favour of employing
‘superior’ foreign technicians. Just as their foreign-built engines and mills held pride of place
100 AHN, Ultramar/Cuba/Fomento, 30/2, No.32.
101 AHN, Estado, 8044/7.
102 Memorias de la Sociedad Económica, Tomo 46b (1855-9).
14
in their plantations, with their power shown off to visitors, so employing a foreign engineer
was also not just a necessity, but something of a status symbol. They may have been able to
pay a native engineer less for the same job, but most were happy to pay a premium to ensure
foreign quality, leaving the Cuban engineering workers to find employment in the poorer
plantations.
But the island’s reliance on foreign engineers continued to rankle.  In 1857, the 
Compañía Española de Fundición y Mecánica (Spanish Foundry and Machine Company) was
formed. Its founder argued that:
The establishment of this Society is evidently useful and even necessary because
in the material of Foundry and Mechanics we depend on foreigners imposing the
law.103
The following year, Manuel Hernández Aranda invented a sugar train that he advertised as
being specificaly ‘Cuban’. His application for a patent and privilege for his invention reads 
more like a nationalist treatise, than a blueprint for a contribution to technology:
Our emerging agriculture demands a great help so as to remove it from that
rachitic state in which it finds itself, and to elevate it to its peak, given that,
without the necessity of begging from foreigners, there exists in our country
extraordinary elements with which to achieve this.
Showing the same excess of patriotic optimism that had doomed the School of Machinery to
ineffectuality, Hernández Aranda believed it possible for Cuba not only to be on the same
level as the industrial countries, but even to rival and surpass them, and all that they would
need was the desire to do so.104
Conclusion
Hernández Aranda and his Cuban sugar train symbolise the shift that had occurred during the
nineteenth century. The same spirit for advancement that the early promoters of new
technology in Cuba had shown, and which had represented a break with the Spanish imperial
past and self-confident hopes for a more independent future, was also demonstrated by
Hernández Aranda, only this time as something of a forlorn hope against the by then
irrepressible forces of technological advancement that were being led and controlled by
foreign powers, exerting ever-increasing control over the Cuban economy and production.
The introduction of steam engines, and related machinery, along with the skilled workers
required to operate them, was not simply an example of this process, but was central to it,
along with the commercial networks with which they were so associated.
Both the spread of steam technology in the nineteenth century, and international trade
from a lot earlier, are examples of how globalising processes were well underway long before
the coining of the term in the late twentieth century. This has long been recognised, as seen in
Immanuel Walerstein’s concept of world systems in understanding the interconnected 
development of the planet’s economy and society, as a necessity for tracing the history of the 
103 ANC, GSC, 1594/81606.
104 ANC, RCJF, 207/9310.
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emergence of the global capitalist system, presided over by European hegemonic powers.105
Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm has shown how the interdependence of every part of this world
system reveals how individual nations come to emerge not just as historically contingent, but
within the constraints imposed by wider, transnational forces.106 Although the machines that
were increasingly revolutionising production worldwide were mainly built in the core
industrialising countries, the technological developments themselves were the result of the
interconnection between manufacturers and their clients, such as Cuba’s sugar planters. The 
actors through which this was made possible were the skilled migrant workers who, like
Charles Edmonstone, were using their presence in the field to stimulate further developments,
so as to better meet the needs of local production. As David Jeremy has argued, migrant
engineering workers were the “by far the most important vehicle of technology transfer”:
[T]hey were able to interact with the technological system on the one hand, with
the natural and cultural environment of the receptor society on the other hand, and
so make the multitude of adjustments that were necessary in accommodating a
new technological system to fresh, cross-cultural surroundings.107
What this Cuban case shows is that the globalising tendencies that were in motion were not
brought about by the imperial designs of powerful nations, intent upon extending their global
influence. At the outset, the impulse came beneath the shadow of conflicting empires, inspired
by the needs and aspirations of local actors, with the collaboration of migrant artisans and
merchants who facilitated Cuba’s entry into the transnational networks that were extending 
themselves globally during the nineteenth century. It is for this reason that I have
characterised this as ‘sub-imperial’ globalisation. 
However, as Cuba’s history shows, for al that it may be necessary to look beyond the 
political boundaries imposed by empires –so as to see the much more complex social
interactions that lay beneath –this is not to deny the dominating role played by imperialism.
The sub-imperial globalising tendencies described here were instrumental in the weakening of
the Spanish empire’s hold over Cuba. Yet, with terible ironic inevitability, out of the flames 
that consumed one empire, stepped the figure of empire reborn. The technological advances
that so inspired the Cuban planters led them into new forms of subjugation, which would lead
at the end of the nineteenth century to freedom from Spain being replaced by domination by
the United States. Thus the compelling figure of Charles Edmonstone riding through all
weathers to spread new machinery to Cuba’s sugar plantations hides the story of how 
engineering advances, spreading independently of imperial projects, could at the same time be
the cause both of the weakening of old imperialisms, and the emergence of new ones.
105 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; and
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Commodities of Empire is a joint research collaboration between the Open
University's Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies and London
Metropolitan University's Caribbean Studies Centre. These two institutions
form the nucleus of a growing international network of researchers and
research centres.
The mutually reinforcing relationship between ‘commodities’and ‘empires’has long been
recognised. Over the last six centuries the quest for profits has driven imperial expansion,
with the global trade in commodities fuelling the ongoing industrial revolution. These
‘commodities of empire’, which became transnationally mobilised in ever larger quantities,
included foodstuffs (wheat, rice, bananas); industrial crops (cotton, rubber, linseed and
palm oils); stimulants (sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco and opium); and ores (tin,
copper, gold, diamonds). Their expanded production and global movements brought vast
spatial, social, economic and cultural changes to both metropoles and colonies.
In the Commodities of Empire project we explore the networks through which such
commodities circulated within, and in the spaces between, empires. We are particularly
attentive to local processes –originating in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America –
which significantly influenced the outcome of the encounter between the world economy
and regional societies, doing so through a comparative approach that explores the
experiences of peoples subjected to different imperial hegemonies.
The following key research questions inform the work of project:
1) The networks through which commodities were produced and circulated within,
between and beyond empires;
2) The interlinking ‘systems’(political-military, agricultural labour, commercial, maritime,
industrial production, social communication, technological knowledge) that were
themselves evolving during the colonial period, and through which these commodity
networks functioned;
3) The impact of agents in the periphery on the establishment and development of
commodity networks: as instigators and promoters; through their social, cultural and
technological resistance; or through the production of anti-commodities;
4) The impact of commodity circulation both on the periphery, and on the economic,
social and cultural life of the metropoles;
5) The interrogation of the concept of ‘globalisation’through the study of the historical
movement and impact of commodities.
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